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I. INTRODUCTION

Given the absence from mention of public education in the United
States Constitution, which identifies the rights and responsibilities of the
federal government, the responsibility for public education lies with the
states. The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
ratified in 1791, specifically states, "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."' Article X, section
3 of the Wisconsin Constitution, adopted in 1848, declares, "The
legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools,
which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable ... ,2 Are Wisconsin's
What have state
school districts as "uniform as practicable?"
policymakers done to achieve this objective? The purpose of this
Article is threefold. First, we present a comprehensive review of the
history and structure of school finance in Wisconsin, with an eye toward
evaluating the degree to which K-12 education finance policy has
changed over time. A key component of this review is a clear
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presentation of the incentives created by school finance equalization
formulas. Second, we present an empirical evaluation of the most
recent changes in Wisconsin's education finance policy, which occurred
during 1996-1997, to determine whether those changes furthered the
goal of uniformity-to the extent that it is practical. Last, policymakers
are once again considering options for further changes in school finance,
and it is our hope that the evaluation presented here is useful as they
consider options for reform.
In Part II, we provide a summary of the history of education finance
reform for the nation as a whole and for Wisconsin in particular. In Part
III, we highlight the key elements of reform and the incentives
introduced in school districts as a result of changing state education
finance and tax restraint policies. In Part IV, we present an empirical
evaluation of the effects of the 1996-1997 reforms introduced by the
Wisconsin legislature. Part V summarizes our findings and conclusions.
II. OVERVIEW OF SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM
Over the past thirty-five years, American schools have been
dramatically affected by school finance equalization ("SFE"). In the
1970s, the California Supreme Court ruled in the landmark case Serrano
v. Priest that the state's public school finance system was
unconstitutional.3 The court also encouraged the state to create an
education finance scheme that was not a function of school district
wealth.4 Since 1970, all states have either experienced similar court
rulings or legislators have taken the lead in reforming their systems of
school finance.' While every school district in the nation has been
affected to some degree by SFE, we venture to say that SFE is generally
not well understood.6 Courts and legislators have defined clear goals,
but precisely how to implement reforms that are consistent with those
goals is much less clear. Regardless, since the early 1970s, almost every
state in the nation has enacted at least one major SFE reform aimed at
redistributing resources from districts with high per-pupil property
3. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 957-58 (Cal. 1976). In 1971 the California
Supreme Court determined that, given the facts, the system was unconstitutional, but
remanded to the trial court to determine whether the facts presented on appeal were true.
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano 1), 487 P.2d 1241, 1244, 1266 (Cal. 1971).
4. See Serrano 1, 487 P.2d at 1260; Sheila E. Murray et al., Education-FinanceReform
and the Distributionof Education Resources, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 789, 789 (1998).
5. Caroline M. Hoxby, All School Finance Equalizationsare not Created Equal, 116 Q. J.
ECON. 1189, 1190 (2001).

6. See id. at 1189.

2007]

WISCONSIN EDUCATION FINANCE POLICY

values to those with low per-pupil property values. 7 However, SFE
policies are not always based on sound economic principles regarding
taxation and redistribution.8 As noted by Caroline Hoxby, in practice,
SFE schemes across the states have sometimes led to outcomes different
from what had been the original intent.9 Below, we present a brief
summary of SFE activity across the states and then offer a discussion
that is specifically focused on the Wisconsin experience.
A. Education Finance Reform Nationwide

With the exception of Hawaii and Michigan,'" the funding of K-12
education is primarily a local responsibility, but state governments
typically provide some sort of assistance to school districts. Prior to the
1970s, most state governments offered something called "categorical
aid" to school districts to assist in the funding of K-12 education.11
Categorical aid is distinguished by two features: (1) it is funded by state
income, sales, and other state taxes with the exception of property taxes;
and (2) the amount of aid received by a given school district depends on
characteristics such as mean household income and the poverty rate. 12
Thus, aid is provided to a particular district on the basis that its residents
have limited resources or that its students are relatively more expensive
to educate. 3 Categorical aid can be distributed either as a "flat grant"
or as a "matching grant."' 14 Under a flat grant, each district receives a
per-pupil grant that depends on income level within the district-the
lower the household income is, the higher the grant amount. 5 Under a
matching system, state governments develop a matching formula such
that the amount of the grant depends on the amount of locally raised
7. Id. at 1189-90, 1212-13 (noting that "SFE has affected every school in the nation" and
that a majority of states that have no SFE have equalization activity).
8. See, e.g., id. at 1190-91 (discussing the unintended consequences of California's SFE).
9. Id. at 1190.
10. In 1993, Michigan dramatically altered its education finance system whereby the
revenues for each district are largely determined by the state government and the schools are
funded primarily by the state sales tax and property tax. Christopher R. Lockard, In the
Wake of Williams v. State: The Past, Present, and Future of Education Finance Litigation in
California, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 385, 418-19 (2005). Hawaii has a single, statewide school
district. ANDREW RESCHOVSKY, WISCONSIN'S SCHOOL FINANCE: A POLICY PRIMER 15 n.1
(2002), available at http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/otherpublications/wisconsin
primer/2002/schoolprimer2002.pdf.
11. Hoxby, supra note 5, at 1193.
12. Id. at 1193-94.
13. Id. at 1194.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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spending and the matching rate depends on household 6income-the
lower the household income, the higher the matching rate.
Following a series of court rulings regarding the fairness of school
spending, states across America began to implement SFE reforms in one
form or another.' 7 Generally, these reforms have taken two forms: (1)
Foundation Aid and (2) Power Equalization or Guaranteed Tax
Revenue ("GTR") schemes. 8 Foundation aid is the most common and
more moderate type of reform. 9 It is in some ways similar to the flat
categorical grant, except that instead of basing the grant on mean
household income, the grant is based on per-pupil property values.20 In
such a scheme, every school district is guaranteed a foundation level
grant, but as per-pupil property values rise, the foundation grant is
reduced.2'
GTR schemes can generate the greatest potential redistribution of
resources." Generally, the goal of this type of reform is to provide state
aid in such a way as to make the same tax rate generate the same
amount of revenue for each school district.' In this type of scheme, the
amount of state aid depends on both per-pupil property valuation and
tax rates; lower valuation and higher tax rates generate more state aid.24
Wisconsin's courts have interpreted state constitutional law to mean
that tax effort across school districts ought to generate similar amounts
of per-pupil spending.2 - Thus, the reforms that have occurred in
Wisconsin, particularly the 1996-1997 reform, can be categorized as a
GTR scheme. Next, we provide a concise discussion of the history of
education finance reform in Wisconsin. A key objective is to identify
the incentives introduced to school districts that are the direct result of
changing state equalization formulas and of the introduction of stateimposed limits on school district revenues.
16. Id.
17. See generally Murray et al., supra note 4, at 791-94 (summarizing the challenges to
the constitutionality of school-finance systems).
18. See Hoxby, supra note 5, at 1194-95. Power equalization and GTR schemes are
fundamentally similar. As a result, this article will refer to them collectively as GTR schemes.
19. Id.
20. Id.

21. Id. at 1195.
22. See id.
23. Id.

24. Id. at 1195-96. Hoxby provides a detailed description of the most extreme GTR
schemes, such as those imposed in California and New Jersey. See id. at 1196-97.
25. See Vincent v. Voight, 2000 WI 93, $ 3-4, 6,236 Wis. 2d 588, $ 3-4, 6, 614 N.W.2d
388, T 3-4, 6; Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 557, 247 N.W.2d 141, 155 (1976).
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B. History of Reform in Wisconsin
In its constitution, adopted in 1848, Wisconsin declared in article X,
section 3 that "[t]he legislature shall provide by law for the
establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as
The establishment of separate school districts
practicable. 2 6
throughout Wisconsin was accomplished through the delegation of
authority to local school boards.27 One such authority provided to local
school boards has been the power to tax. 28 Hence, local school districts
have always collected local property taxes to support educational
programs and services. The degree of reliance on the local property tax,
however, has caused frustration among taxpayers and policymakers
alike. In addition, because no two school districts are identical in size
(geographic or population) or have the same ability to raise dollars
through taxation due to varying amounts of local property tax base, the
state has also provided financial support to schools.29 Initially, this
support was provided to every school in the form of a flat amount of aid
per pupil. This original aid, the Common School Fund or Library Aid,
had as its purpose to support and maintain common schools in each
district while purchasing suitable school libraries. 3°
Because the property tax was the major source of funding for
operating public schools across the state, the disparities across
communities due to the impact of the uneven distribution of school
enrollments and property tax bases had, by the 1920s, become apparent.
In 1923-1924, the statewide equalized valuation was $5 billion (nominal
dollars).3 Dividing that amount by the 480,000 students enrolled in
public schools provided an average of $10,116 in statewide average tax
base behind each student. 32 While this produced an average tax rate of
$9.25 mills ($9.25 per $1000 in property value), some communities paid
more, while others paid considerably less.33 Examples that varied
substantially from the average were the 30 districts in Adams County

26. WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3.
27. ALAN W. KINGSTON, WIS. DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, BULLETIN NO. 4324, THE
HISTORY OF WISCONSIN'S _ENERAL STATE AID FORMULA FOR ELEMENTARY AND HIGH

SCHOOL DISTRICTS 1-2 (1983).

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. WIS. CONST. art. X, § 2.
31. KINGSTON, supra note 27, at 2.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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with less than $500 of taxable property per student and the 21 districts
with more than $10,000. '
In 1924 and 1926, state Superintendent of Public Instruction 35 John
Callahan recommended that the state provide greater financial support
for public education and that an effort be made to adjust for the
variations in available tax base among local districts.36
Sections
20.245(4)(b)(1) and 20.245(4)(b)(2) of the equalization law enactment of
1927 included a flat aid amount per teacher ($250) but also apportioned
state funds on the basis of a guaranteed tax base of $250,000 for each
elementary teacher. 37 Districts with wealth in excess of the guaranteed
amount were restricted to the first level, flat aid.38
Public policy concerning the distribution of state aids to public
schools continued with this combination of flat aids and an equalized
distribution per teacher until 1949 when the legislature converted the
formula to a per-pupil guaranteed tax base and increased the overall
level of state support. 39 Recognizing that property valuations and the
number of pupils varied significantly among school districts, it was
believed that local property valuations had to be supplemented by an
additional tax base.
Alan Kingston, author of The History of
Wisconsin's GeneralState Aid Formulafor Elementary and High School
Districts, wrote in 1983 that "Wisconsin's equalization aid program
supplements the tax base in low valuation districts by placing a
guaranteed valuation back of each resident child (rather than per
elementary teacher unit) in an attempt to equalize educational
opportunities for all of the students in the state. '" ° State policymakers
described the purpose of state support in 1949 in the following
philosophy statement that still exists today, with only minor changes, in
Wisconsin Statutes section 121.01:
It is declared to be the policy of this state that education
is a state function and that some relief should be afforded

34. Id.
35. Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction required by article X, section 1 of
the Wisconsin Constitution.
36. KINGSTON, supra note 27, at 2.
37. Id. at 3.
38. Id.
39. See Act of Aug. 6, 1949, ch. 600, 1949 Wis. Sess. Laws 536-42; see also RICHARD A.
ROSSMILLER, As NEARLY UNIFORM AS PRACTICABLE? 2 (1991) (preparing information for
the Wisconsin Association of School District Administrators).
40. KINGSTON, supra note 27, at 10-11.
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from the local general property tax as a source of public
school revenue where such tax is excessive, and that
other sources of revenue should contribute a larger
percentage of the total funds needed. It is further
declared that in order to provide reasonable equality of
educational opportunity for all the children of this state,
the state must guarantee that a basic educational
opportunity be available to each pupil, but that the state
should be obligated to contribute to the educational
program only if the school district provides a program
which meets state standards. It is the purpose of the
state aid formula . . . to cause the state to assume a
greater proportion of the costs of public education and to
relieve the general property of some of its tax burden."
While labeled differently, the state aid structure that evolved at that
time continued with the two-part system of flat aids and equalized aids.
Significant change was then made to the state aid distribution system in
the early 1970s when an overall tax base equalization program was
enacted.4 2 The legislature at that time was influenced by (1) the
recommendations from a task force appointed by then-Governor
Patrick J. Lucey, which was named after its Chair, Ruth B. Doyle,
mother of the current Wisconsin Governor; (2) the recommendations
offered by a legislative council study; and (3) the urging of
representatives of the Department of Public Instruction ("DPI").43 The
result was a major overhaul of the school finance system as well as the
imposition of cost controls on school districts.
Chapter 90 of the Laws of 1973, as adopted by the legislature and
signed into law, contained a complete tax base equalization program.'
The changes included a significant increase in state funding to about
40% and the discontinuation of flat aids.45 A two-level, power
equalizing, state aid formula was instituted that distributed state dollars
on the basis of local tax base, with poorer districts getting
proportionately more state support and wealthier districts getting less. 6
Ii addition to increasing the level of state funding and instituting a new

41. ROsSMILLER, supra note 39, at 2.
42. Ch. 90, 1973 Wis. Sess. Laws 380-85; ROSSMILLER, supra note 39, at 3.
43. See generally KINGSTON, supra note 27, at 4.
44. Ch. 90, 1973 Wis. Sess. Laws 380-85; ROSSMILLER, supra note 39, at 3.
45. KINGSTON, supra note 27, at 146.
46. ROSSMILLER, supra note 39, at 3.
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distribution formula, this legislation modified the kinds of local costs to
be shared by the state by adding a portion of a district's capital and debt
retirement costs along with teacher retirement costs, which had
previously been paid by the state.47' The effect was to provide tax relief
to local taxpayers. The 1973 action also instituted a set of minimum
education standards and imposed cost controls, although local districts
could appeal for exemptions to meet the standards, to preserve ongoing
programs, and to continue programs where federal funding lapsed. 4
The purpose of the cost controls was to ensure that property tax relief
would result from the increased state support.
The state aid distribution formula applied in 1973 was based on the
concept of equalization. 49 Equalization-as defined consistently in the
DPI annual publication of Basic Facts and quoted here from the most
recent issue-is "[t]he process of ensuring a minimum tax base (the
guaranteed valuation) for the support of education for each pupil in
Wisconsin, so that school districts which spend at the same level will tax
at the same rate."5 ° According to the 1992-1993 Basic Facts, "[t]he goal
of an equalizing aid formula is to eliminate differences in ability to
spend while allowing for variation in willingness to spend for
education." 5'
The two-level formula created in 1973 provided a guaranteed
amount of property value behind each pupil at each of the two levels.
These two levels were labeled primary and secondary aids.5 2 School
district costs (shared costs) were divided between these two levels by a
factor labeled the primary cost ceiling, which was defined at the time as
110% of the previous year's statewide average shared cost.5 3 Costs
below this amount were classified as primary costs and eligible for
primary state aid.' All spending above this threshold was defined as
secondary costs and was shared by the state at a lower ratio. A lower
level of guaranteed value (property value) was used to apportion aids
47. Id.
48. KINGSTON, supra note 27, at 143.
49. ROSSMILLER, supra note 39, at 3.

50. Wis. Dep't of Pub. Instruction, Glossary to BASIC FACTS ABOUT WISCONSIN'S
2004-2005 (2005), http://dpi.wi.gov/sfs /sectj.html
(last visited Mar. 13, 2007).
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS
51. WIS.

DEP'T

OF

PUB.

INSTRUCTION,
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ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS 1992-1993, at 95 (1993)

FACTS 1992-1993].
52. KINGSTON, supra note 27, at 140.

53. Id.
54. See id. at 140-41.
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associated with these higher costs. 5 This was done deliberately "to
serve as a disincentive to high levels of spending."56
Further equalization occurred within this formula because districts
whose wealth exceeded the secondary guarantee and whose spending
exceeded the threshold set by the primary cost ceiling incurred negative
aids.57 The degree to which a district's actual tax base exceeded the
state secondary guarantee was used to reduce the district's primary
aids. 8 This type of negative aid has remained in every version of the
state aid formula since.5 9 Under this formula, some wealthier districts
became ineligible for state general aids because the amount of negative
aid generated at the secondary level reduced the level of primary aid to
zero. In a few situations involving very wealthy and high spending
districts, the amount of negative secondary aid exceeded the primary aid
altogether and created negative aid recapture.' This aspect of the
formula was never implemented because it was subject to immediate
legal challenge." Ultimately, negative aid recapture that would have
required districts to levy a local tax to be remitted to the state and
redistributed in other localities was deemed unconstitutional in
November 1976 by the Wisconsin Supreme Court because it violated the
Uniformity Clause in the state constitution.6 2 Consequently, according
to Richard A. Rossmiller, Ph.D., "Wisconsin's general school aid
equalization program can no longer be considered a true power
equalizing program because districts having the same cost per student
are not required to levy the same tax rate.""
The two-level equalization aid formula remained intact as the major
method of distributing state aid to school districts, with variations in the
method of calculation of the state aid factors. From 1949 through 1973,
flat aids were granted to high valued districts that were ineligible for
equalized aid. 64 These were distributed on a per-pupil basis. Although

55. Id. at 141.
56. ROSSMILLER, supra note 39, at 3.
57. See id.
58. See ch. 90, 1973 Wis. Sess. Laws 383.
59. See KINGSTON, supra note 27, at 199 (noting the passage of the first negative aid
provision).
60. Id. at 142.
61. Id. at 217; ROSSMILLER, supra note 39, at 3-4.
62. Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 581, 247 N.W.2d 141,155 (1976); ROSSMILLER, supra
note 39, at 3-4.
63. ROSSMILLER, supra note 39, at 4.
64. Id. at 2-3.
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they were eliminated in 1973, flat aids, known as minimum aids, were
reinstituted in the mid-1980s65 and existed until 1996.6
Special
adjustment payments were also available to help cushion the local
impact of reductions in aid from one year to the next. These served as a
"hold harmless" that provided such a district with a portion of the aid it
had received in the previous year. Examples included 90% or 85% 8 of
67
the prior year's aid amount. These aids continue in existence today.
State policymakers again sought to increase the level of state support
in the mid-1990s. In 1993, a legislative commitment was made to twothirds funding of schools (defined in the statute at that time as twothirds of partial school revenues). 6 This was done to significantly
reduce the reliance on local property taxes. The level of state support
was 48.4% in 1993-1994 and 52.7% in 1995-1996.7o To foster the
desired property tax relief, controls on employee wage settlements were
established7 and revenue limits were imposed on school districts.'
These controls went into effect in 1993, 73 while the increase in state
funding was actually implemented in 1996-1997. 74
With the increase in state funding came modifications in how the
funds were distributed. In 1995, the formula was transformed from two
levels of funding to three. 7 The new three-tiered formula added a new
level of sharing. Tertiary aids were added to the already existing
primary and secondary aids, with the guaranteed valuation at the new
primary level increasing to $2 million behind each pupil.7 6 This made
every district in the state eligible for primary aid, allowing policymakers
to eliminate the minimum aids to wealthy school districts.77 This level of
funding applied to the first $1000 of spending (shared cost), making all
districts in the state eligible for equalization aid. 8 The secondary and
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 3, 25-26.
See 1995 Executive Budget Act, Act 27, 1995 Wis. Sess. Laws 30, 502.
WIS. STAT. § 121.105 (1993-1994).
WIS. STAT. § 121.105 (2003-2004).
See Fiscal Adjustment Act, Act 437, 1993 Wis. Sess. Laws 1357, 1392-93.

70. Russ

KAVA

&

LAYLA

MERRIFIELD,

Wis.

LEGISLATIVE

FISCAL BUREAU,

INFORMATIONAL PAPER NO. 27, ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL AIDS 5 (2005).

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Act 16, 1993 Wis. Sess. Laws 310.
Id. at 317.
Id.
1995 Executive Budget Act, Act 27,1995 Wis. Sess. Laws at 502-03.
Id. at 501-02.
See id. at 501.
See id. at 502.
See id. at 501.
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tertiary levels functioned similarly to what the two-level formulas had
previously, including the generation of negative aids for districts whose
level of spending exceeded the secondary cost ceiling and whose
property tax base exceeded the guarantee. 9
A review of the changes in the school aid formula over the past half
century points out some consistencies in purpose.
The current
Wisconsin statute contains the general purpose of state funding as
follows:
It is declared to be the policy of this state that education
is a state function and that some relief should be afforded
from the local general property tax as a source of public
school revenue where such tax is excessive, and that
other sources of revenue should contribute a larger
percentage of the total funds needed. It is further
declared that in order to provide reasonable equality of
educational opportunity for all the children of this state,
the state must guarantee that a basic educational
opportunity be available to each pupil, but that the state
should be obligated to contribute to the educational
program only if the school district provides a program
which meets state standards. It is the purpose of the
state aid formula set forth in this subchapter to cause the
state to assume a greater proportion of the costs of public
education and to relieve the general property of some of
its tax burden.'
First, this statement affirms that education is a state function. This
acknowledgement is followed by several public policy goals. They can
be outlined as follows:
(1) Educational Opportunity: "It is further declared that in order to
provide reasonableequality of educationalopportunityfor all the
children of this state, the state must guarantee that a basic
educationalopportnity be available to each pupil...

79. See id. at 502.
80. WIS. STAT. § 121.01 (2003-2004).
81. Id. (emphasis added).
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(2) State Educational Standards: "[T]he state should be obligated to
contribute to the educational program only if the school district
provides a program which meets state standards."'
(3) Level of State Funding: "It is the purpose of the state aid formula
set forth in this subchapter to cause the state to assume a greater
proportionof the costs of public education.... "83
(4) Property Tax Relief: "[T]hat some relief should be afforded
from the local general property tax as a source of public school
revenue where such tax is excessive, and that other sources of
revenue should contribute a larger percentage of the total funds
needed" and "to relieve the general property of some of its tax
burden."84
(5) Distribution of State Funds: "[Tihat some relief should be
affordedfrom the local generalproperty tax as a source of public
school revenue where such tax is excessive." 85
The appearance of this statement of purpose at the beginning of the
chapter in state law that defines specific areas of state aid and the
parameters for its distribution acknowledges the need for state
intervention in the form of both state standards and financial support to
protect the interests of every pupil in the state. The commitment to a
high level of state support was, during the mid-1990s, defined as
66.7%.' While a specific level of state funding is no longer defined in
the statute, it would appear that policymakers remain committed to a
substantial level of state support.
A number of public policy changes occurred in the 1990s that appear
to be consistent with this statement of purpose. This study examines
patterns of local spending and taxing that occurred before and after two
of these changes. They include the introduction of three levels of state
sharing through the equalization aid formula, as opposed to two, along
with the imposition of state-imposed revenue controls.
The following questions are examined as they relate to these changes
in state policy:

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
1995 Executive Budget Act, Act 27, 1995 Wis. Sess. Laws 30, 503.
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(1) Did the changes in the equalization aid formula (from two to
three tiers) bring district spending closer together or further
apart?
(2) Did the changes in the equalization aid formula (from two to
three tiers) serve as a deterrent or incentive for increased own
source spending?
(3) Did the imposition of and subsequent changes to the stateimposed revenue limits bring district spending closer together or
further apart?
(4) Given these findings, what considerations should be included in
current public policy debates over school funding issues?
In a 1992-1993 publication, the DPI indicated that "[s]tate law
provides for two levels of state support, and therefore, two guaranteed
valuations-one for 'low' costs and one for 'high' costs."'8 From the
historical review, it would appear that the public policy intent behind
the second tier of a two-level, state aid formula was to create a
disincentive effect for higher spending districts. Clearly, districts
spending above the primary cost ceiling, regardless of wealth (tax base
value), received a lower amount of state support for those expenditures.
Wealthier districts spending above that threshold but having more tax
base than the formula guaranteed were further penalized due to
negative secondary aids that reduced the amount of primary aids
received.m
The three-tier formula, which was implemented in 1996-1997,
operates the same way between the second and third levels. Because
the first (primary) level of aid deals with only the first $1000 in spending,
all districts spent more than this amount; therefore, they incurred
secondary costs. 9 Granted, a few of the very wealthiest Wisconsin
school districts have tax bases that exceed even the primary guarantee
(currently set statutorily at $1.93 million) and are only eligible for
special adjustment aid.' ° There are also some districts with tax bases
under the primary guarantee but over the secondary level. These
districts are held harmless under current law and receive the amount of
aid gceiruted II
i he fIsi iiel, eveu ihough, in sohnt cases, tile aioulli Ut
87. BASIC FACTS 1992-1993, supra note 51, at 94.
88. ROSSMILLER, supra note 39, at 3.
89. See WIS. STAT. § 121.07(6)(b) (2003-2004); KAVA & MERRIFIELD, supra note 70, at
9.
90. See Wis. STAT. §§ 121.105, 121.07(7)(a) (2003-2004).
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negative secondary aid would more than eliminate their primary aid. 9'
Hence, the typical and vast majority of districts in Wisconsin have
property values that fall either between the secondary and tertiary
guarantees or over the tertiary guarantee but not so much so that they
do not enjoy both primary and secondary state aid. A combination of
local characteristics and state aid factors directly influence an individual
school district's eligibility for state equalization aid.
Several local characteristics that affect a district's eligibility for state
aid include its level of spending, its wealth or ability to raise taxes
(measured in terms of local property tax base), and its number of pupils
(members, because the pupil head count is converted to a full-time
equivalent membership for state aid purposes). In both the state aid
and revenue limit formulas, the number of pupils enrolled is the single
most critical variable because spending, revenue, and tax base are all
evaluated in the formulas on a per-pupil basis.' Hence, the more pupils
a district enrolls, the lower the tax base, spending (shared cost), and
revenue are on a per-pupil basis, and the greater are state aid and
allowable revenues. Yet the degree to which local districts have control
over these conditions may vary.
Local districts have little control over shifts in equalized valuation,
although local school and municipal officials can work together in
managing local growth with school enrollments in mind. Housing
patterns, in turn, may influence the number of young families settling or
remaining in a community. There are, of course, variables (such as
economic growth and the job market) over which local educators may
have little or no influence and these may impact local population
patterns as well.
If a district's pupil count increases, whether due to local economic
trends or through local educational initiatives or both, a district is able
to raise revenues and spend at a higher rate. The ability to raise
additional revenue allows a district to spend more, given the stateimposed revenue limits, compared with districts whose enrollment is
stable or even declining. In addition, the level of local spending directly
affects state sharing of local costs. Where state sharing increases, the
local effort required for that additional spending may actually decrease,
depending on the relationship between increased spending, the pupil
count, and how a district is situated in the formula. Figure 1 depicts the

91. See generally KAVA & MERRIFIELD, supranote 70, at 9-10.
92. See generally WIS. STAT. § 121.07 (2003-2004).
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three levels of sharing contained in the 2001-2002 Equalization Aid
Formula.
Here are the ways that districts may be affected, based upon where
their spending and property values fall in the state aid formula:
* Spending & Tax Base Within the Secondary Level
A district with spending and overall property value falling within the
secondary range could increase its spending within the secondary level
of sharing and enjoy increased state aid at the same ratio as all of its
previous secondary costs. Hence, all new spending would be funded
between the state and local taxpayers just the same as all previous costs.
* Secondary Spending Crossing into Tertiary Spending with Tax
Base Less Than the Tertiary Guarantee
If a district's spending goes from the secondary to the tertiary level,
yet its property value remains less than the tertiary guarantee, it would
also receive additional state sharing, but at a lower ratio for those costs
that exceed the secondary cost ceiling. As a result, the taxpayers would
pay for a larger share of the new spending than they did of the original
costs (or any remaining at the secondary level).
* Increased Tertiary Spending with Tax Base Less Than the
Tertiary Guarantee
If a district's spending increases within the tertiary level, yet its
property value remains less than the tertiary guarantee, it would also
receive additional state sharing with all new costs being shared at the
lower ratio produced by dividing the district's equalized value per pupil
by the state's tertiary guarantee. Here, the taxpayers would continue to
carry the same liability for all new spending that they had previously for
that portion of spending falling above the secondary cost ceiling.
* Secondary Spending Crossing Into Tertiary Spending with Tax
Base Greater Than the Tertiary Guarantee
If a district's spending goes from the secondary to the tertiary level,
yet its property value is greater than the tertiary guarantee, it would
create negative tertiary aids that would offset a portion of its secondary
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aids, thus lowering overall aids. In this case, the local taxpayers would
bear the total cost of all new spending in addition to assuming
responsibility for a greater portion of original costs.
Tertiary Spending with Tax Base Greater Than the Tertiary
Guarantee
If a district's spending increases within tertiary costs and its property
value exceeds the tertiary guarantee, the amount of negative tertiary aid
would increase with the net aid eligibility decreasing. Again in this case,
local taxpayers would pay for the new costs plus more of the original
level of spending.
Once again, it should be noted that districts with increases in tax
base, pupils, or both, either in relation to their spending increase or in
relation to other districts, or the statewide average, will experience
increased secondary aids. This can serve to increase the district's ratio
of sharing whether costs go up measurably or not. Such increases in tax
base or pupil counts may also mitigate the impact of negative aids. So,
while the state aid formula contains a built-in disincentive for higher
spending through the lower ratio of sharing of tertiary costs, as well as
the potential for negative aids, districts may experience enhanced aids
while increasing costs, depending on how all three of the variables
interact with one another.
In addition to changes in the local variables, state factors in the state
aid formula also impact a school district's state aid eligibility. These fall
into two categories: (1) the levels of the guarantees provided at each of
the three levels; and (2) the amount of the cost ceilings (thresholds) that
divide primary and secondary costs and secondary and tertiary costs.
Table 1 outlines these factors as they were defined in the two years
considered in this study.
A review of the statutory language between the two-tier formula in
1993-1994 (original) and the three-tier formula in 2001-2002 (revised)
reveals several similarities. Both formulas are designed to equalize tax
efforts across school districts through setting guaranteed amounts of
property value behind each pupil in the state and then comparing the
local value to those guarantees to establish a ratio of sharing.93 Both

93. Compare WiS. STAT. § 121.07(7)(a) (1993-1994), with WIS. STAT. § 121.07(7)(a)
(2001-2002).
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formulas contain multiple tiers with a built-in disincentive for higher
own-source spending. 94
The obvious difference between the formulas is the number of tiers.
In spite of the additional tier, equalization continues to occur at each
level, and both are designed to fully distribute the amount of the state
aid appropriation provided in the state budget. 95 In the original
formula, the primary guarantee is adjusted to whatever dollar amount
facilitates that full distribution, while it is the secondary guarantee that
is used for this purpose in the revised version." Hence, it is the other
formula factors that deserve more attention, as they are the ones for
which definitions were changed by policymakers in the process of
making revisions to the formula. These represent some of the more
subtle changes that affect how the local variables interact with the
formula to produce the level of state sharing for individual local
districts.
The cost ceilings are used to define the levels of spending in each
tier. Only one such ceiling or threshold was needed in the original
formula. The amount of this ceiling was "set by law, usually as part of
the state's biennial budget, and [was] usually related to the state average
shared cost per member." 98 At other times, as was the case in 19931994, the statute directed that the amount used the previous year be
modified by applying the rate of inflation in subsequent years.'
The revised formula needed two ceilings in order to identify costs to
be shared at each of the three levels.'m The first threshold, the primary
cost ceiling, was set at $1000.°1 This coincided with the establishment of
a very high guaranteed value that exceeded the value of nearly all
Wisconsin school districts at the time."° This combination of factors

94. See Wis. STAT. § 121.07(7)(b) (1993-1994); WIS. STAT. § 121.07(7)(b), (bin) (20012002).
95. WIS. STAT. § 121.07(7)(b) (1993-1994); WIS. STAT. § 121.07(7)(b) (2001-2002).
96. Compare WIS. STAT. § 121.07(7)(a) (1993-1994), with WIS. STAT. § 121.07(7)(b)

(2001-2002).
97. WIS. STAT. § 121.07(b) (1993-1994).
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ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS 1990-1991, at 175 (1991) [hereinafter BASIC
FACTS 1990-1991].
99. WIS. STAT. § 121.07(b) (1993-1994).
100. WIS. STAT. § 121.07(6)(b), (d) (2001-2002).
101. Id. § 121.07(6)(b).
102. 1995 Executive Budget Act, Act 27, 1995 Wis. Sess. Laws 30, 501; see also WIS.
DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, BASIC FACTS ABOUT WISCONSIN'S ELEMENTARY AND

SECONDARY SCHOOLS 1993-1994, at 102-43 (1994) [hereinafter BASIC FACTS 1993-1994].
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amounted to a deliberate policy decision to make every district in the
state eligible for some general state aid on an equalized basis. 3 The
change allowed policymakers to eliminate the unpopular flat aids that
previously existed for just the wealthiest districts."
The secondary cost ceiling then had to be set to divide costs between
the second and third levels of sharing. This ceiling was determined to be
a calculated amount each year set at 90% of the previous year's state
average shared cost. 1° A comparison between the primary cost ceiling
in the original formula and the secondary cost ceiling in the revised
formula shows that one was based upon (or adjusted with inflationary
increases from) the state average shared cost per pupil while the other
was calculated using 90% of the state average. 6 The effect of this
change on local school districts has been to force more costs into the
tertiary level. This results in those costs being shared at a lower ratio by
the state. In spite of the higher level of sharing provided for the first
$1000 of spending (in the first tier of the new formula), the lowering of
the threshold for spending at the upper end serves as a further
disincentive for higher spending.
Considering the impact that state public policy decisions have on
local districts, it is also interesting to note that in the 1970s the primary
cost ceiling vacillated between 105% and 110% of the state average.107
It would appear, then, that state legislatures have over several decades
made a conscious effort to strengthen the disincentive for higher
spending by lowering the higher cost ceiling, thereby placing more and
more costs into the higher and lower state-supported portion of the
formula. °"
The result has been that more districts have found
themselves in tertiary spending with lower ratios of state support for
those costs, with more of those districts incurring negative tertiary
aids.' °9

103. See RESCHOVSKY, supra note 10, at 3.
104. See 1995 Executive Budget Act, Act 27, 1995 Wis. Sess. Laws 30, 502.
105. WIS. STAT. § 121.07(6)(d) (2001-2002).
106. Compare WIS. STAT. § 121.07(6)(b) (1993-1994), with Wis. STAT. § 121.07(6)(d)
(2001-2002).
107. KINGSTON, supra note 27, at 210.
108. See id. (noting the variation of the cost ceiling as 105% to 110% of state average net
cost); see also WIS. STAT. § 121.07(6)(d) (2001-2002) (showing a formula for the cost ceiling
as 90% of the state average cost).
109. See KAVA & MERRIFIELD, supra note 70, at 9-10.
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The addition of the $2 million (since changed to $1.93 million)"'
guarantee for the first $1000 in spending in the revised formula has been
discussed. A further comparison can be made, however, between the
other guaranteed values (those used to determine the ratio of sharing
for higher spending) set in the two formulas. For this purpose, the
secondary guaranteed value per member in the original formula is
comparable to the tertiary guaranteed value in the revised formula.
Yet, the original formula defined this guarantee as equal to 106% of
state average equalized property value per member,"' while the revised
tertiary value was based on 100% of the statewide average."' The result
has been less state sharing of higher costs, with local taxpayers paying a
higher portion of those costs."3 Once again, this result created an even
greater disincentive for higher own-source spending while, at the same
time, pushing more districts into tertiary or even negative tertiary
situations solely due to the change in state-level policy.
Additionally, changes in the definition of shared cost by the state
affect local state aid eligibility. Historic changes in the areas of capital
costs or debt retirement certainly affect property taxes and, therefore,
may influence local spending decisions. For example, through the 1980s,
debt retirement (long-term principal and interest payments) was14
included in shared costs only up to a maximum of $90 per student."
Since 1990-1991, all debt retirement costs have been included in shared
costs,"5 thereby providing state sharing (based upon where a district's
overall spending falls in either the two or three-tiered formulas).
C. Revenue Caps in Wisconsin
In anticipation of the major increase in state aid (two-thirds) that
was promised to be provided in 1995-1996 and to ensure that property
tax relief would result from this influx of new state money, the
Wisconsin legislature imposed limits on annual school district revenue
growth beginning in 1993.116 The limits included property taxes and
state aid, which combined account for more than 80% of a district's total

110. 2001 Executive Budget Act, Act 16, 2001 Wis. Sess. Laws 1473.

111. WIS. STAT. § 121.07(7)(b) (1993-1994).
112. WIS. STAT. § 121.07(7)(bm) (2001-2002).
113. See infra Part III.
114. BASIC FACTS 1990-1991, supra note 98, at 103.
115. Id. at 102-03.
116. Wis. Dep't of Pub. Instruction, Revenue Limit Explanation and Example (2005),
http://dpi.wi.gov/sfs/revlimex.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
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revenue.1 7 Initially established annually by the legislature, current
school district revenue limits are adjusted annually by the rate of
inflation.'18 In the 2004-2005 school year, district revenue growth was
capped at $241.01 per pupil. "9
The basis for the revenue caps in 1993 was the actual amount of
spending per pupil in each school district in 1992-1993.2o School
districts were then allowed to increase their controlled revenues by $190
per pupil, or they could apply the then-current rate of inflation ("CPI")
to the prior year spending base.12 ' The inflation rate at that time was
3.2%; hence, while the majority of districts in the state applied the flat
dollar increase, the highest spending ones were able to increase their
caps by 3.2%, which amounted to as much as $355 in the highest
spending district. 122 The initial revenue caps that resulted across the
state in 1993-1994 ranged from $4117 per pupil in the Waterford J1
School District 2 3 and $4116 in the lowest spending K-12 district, 124 to
$10,294 in the Nicolet UHS district,1 25127$6767 in Shorewood,126 and $7778
in the highest spending K-12 district.
The second year of the cap (1994-1995) functioned in the same way.
Districts could either apply the flat dollar increase of $194.37 or they
could take the current rate of inflation (2.3%) multiplied by their base
revenue per member, based on the amount levied the previous year up
to the maximum allowable for that year. 128 Again, this created higher
dollar increases for the higher spending districts that ranged from
$194.37 to $255 per pupil. 129
By the third year of the caps, 1995-1996, through 1995 Wisconsin
Act 27,'30 the state changed the method of calculating the annual
allowable increase for all districts. Rather than offering the option of
117. KAVA & MERRIFIELD, supra note 70, at 3.

118. WIS. STAT. § 121.91(2m)(e)(2) (2003-2004).
119. Russ KAVA & RICK OLIN, WiS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, INFORMATIONAL
PAPER No. 12, LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND REVENUE LIMITS 3 (2007).
120. Act of Apr. 14, 1994, Act 310, 1993 Wis. Sess. Laws 317.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
KAVA & OLIN, supra note 119, at 2.
BASIC FACTS 1993-1994, supra note 102, at 139.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 110.
KAVA & OLIN, supra note 119, at 2-3.
See id.
1995 Executive Budget Act, Act 27, 1995 Wis. Sess. Laws 30.
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taking the flat dollar increase or applying the rate of inflation to the
prior year's base, the legislature determined that all districts would be
treated alike."' Hence, from that time forward, a flat dollar amount was
identified each year (tied to the rate of inflation) by which all districts
would be permitted to raise the controlled revenues.132 The history of
the annual increments is identified in Table 2.
In addition to adopting a uniform annual increment, the legislature,
through 1995 Wisconsin Act 27, also provided greater flexibility for low
spending districts. " '
A low spending minimum was established,
beginning in 1995-1996, that allowed districts spending below that
threshold to increase their annual revenues beyond the amount of the
annual increment to the amount needed to bring their spending up to
that threshold."
The historical amounts of these thresholds are
provided in Table 3. Twenty-nine districts were eligible for the low
revenue bump in 1995-1996.' While the allowable increase per pupil in
that year was $200 for all districts, these districts were allowed to exceed
that amount enough to bring total revenues up to the $5300 low
spending threshold set for that year. 3 6 An indicator of how much below
the spending of other districts this group was is the fact that the total of
the standard per pupil increase ($200) for this group of twenty-nine
districts was $5800. 137 While the additional per-pupil amounts allowed
ranged from $10.63 in Wild Rose to $567.79 in Campbellsport, the
average additional increase for these districts was $178.16 and the
aggregate per-pupil amount for this group of districts was $5166.59, an
amount very close to the aggregate original allowable increase of

$5800. 138
By 2001-2002 the number of districts eligible for the low revenue
adjustment had declined to four from among the original set of
districts.139 The per-pupil adjustment amounts ranged from $10.57 to
$242.38, with an average for the group of $120.27 and an aggregate perpupil amount of $481.09.'4 These amounts were, again, in addition to
131. See id. at 504-05.
132.

!d.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See id.
Id.
See infra Table 4.
1995 Executive Budget Act, Act 27, 1995 Wis. Sess. Laws 30, 504.
See infra Table 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the $226.68 base revenue limit increase allowed for all districts in 20012002; the aggregate for these four districts was $906.72.' 4'
The reduction from twenty-nine districts being eligible for the low
revenue adjustment in 1995-1996 to four in 2001-2002 and the reduction
in the allowable per-pupil amounts for each of the four remaining
eligible districts demonstrate that every one of the districts able to take
advantage of this opportunity to raise additional revenues has done so.
Considering that the state revenue cap policy in 1994-1995 did not
contain such a provision helps explain the degree to which spending
increased over the term of this study. It is also worth noting that in the
1994-1995 school year, 35% (149 of 426 districts) of the school districts
did not raise revenues to the allowable limits. 42 In 2001-2002, the
percentage had dropped to 24% (n=101).143
The principle exemption to the revenue limits is if a district
successfully passes a referendum for either capital projects or operations
expenses."
If a bonding referendum is approved by the voters, the
annual debt service payments are exempt from the revenue limits. 45 If
the referendum is specifically for the purpose of exceeding the revenue
limit, it must specify whether
the time period by which to exceed the
46
limit is fixed or indefinite.
Between 1991 and April 2004, there were 1901 referenda questions
presented to voters throughout the state. 47 Of those, 1343 were for
capital projects (new construction, remodeling, sports facilities, etc.) and
536 sought to exceed the revenue limits. 148 Capital projects, in general,
had a much greater chance of passing when compared to49 questions to
exceed the spending caps (54% versus 40% success rates).'

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See WIS. STAT. § 121.91(3)(a) (2003-2004).
145. Id. § 121.91(4)(c).
146. Id. § 121.91(3)(a).
147. See generally Craig Maher & Mark Skidmore, Education Finance Reform, School
Referenda Activity and Success Rates: Evidence from Wisconsin (April 2006) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors); Wisconsin Taxpayers Alliance, http://www.wistax.org (last
visited Mar. 13, 2007); Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, http://dpi.state.wi.us (last
visited Mar. 13, 2007); U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov (last visited Mar. 13, 2007).
148. Maher & Skidmore, supra note 147, at 8.
149. See generally id.; Wisconsin Taxpayers Alliance, supra note 147; Wisconsin
Department of Public Instruction, supra note 147; U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 147.
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As shown in an earlier study," the number and success of referenda
was affected by state policy, particularly the state's commitment to fund
two-thirds of school costs beginning in 1996-1997. In 1993-1994, 129
separate referenda questions for bonding purposes were submitted to
voters, totaling $751 million dollars, and 52% were successfully
passed. 5' In fiscal year 1995, the number of bonding referenda was 128,
totaling $901 million, and 55% passed. 5 2 In fiscal year 1996, the number
of capital-related projects jumped to 164 referenda, totaling $1.24
billion, and 63% won voter approval.'53 Similarly, in fiscal year 1997,
147 bonding-related referenda questions, totaling $1.19 billion, were
introduced, and 58% were successful. 15 4 So, in both the number of
bonding referenda and success rates, the period surrounding the state's
two-thirds commitment witnessed a dramatic increase in local and state
costs for bonding projects.
III. INCENTIVES CREATED BY CHANGING POLICIES
The previous discussion highlights the key elements of school
finance reform in Wisconsin. Hoxby shows clearly that school finance
equalization efforts have led to significant changes in school funding
across the states,'55 and the same is true for Wisconsin. However, it is
important to note that in addition to the level of funding provided by
the state, changes in the revenue limit and state aid formulas generated
incentives to either increase or reduce own-source spending.
How the changes in the state funding formula affect local school
district spending choices may depend in part on the tax price faced by
the school districts. The tax price, which is the cost to a school district of
increasing spending by an additional dollar, depends on how state aid is
distributed to the school districts. In Wisconsin, the tax price changed
significantly for many school districts as a result of the 1996-1997
150. See generally Maher & Skidmore, supra note 147; Wisconsin Taxpayers Alliance,
supra note 147; Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, supra note 147; U.S. Census
Bureau, supra note 147.
151. See generally Maher & Skidmore, supra note 147; Wis. Department of Public
Instruction, Referendum Information, http://dpi.wi.gov/sfs/referendum.html (search year
specitied) (last visited Mar. 13, 2007).
152. See generally Maher & Skidmore, supra note 147; Wis. Department of Public
Instruction, Referendum Information, supra note 151.
153. See generally Maher & Skidmore, supra note 147; Wis. Department of Public
Instruction, Referendum Information, supra note 151.
154. See generally Maher & Skidmore, supra note 147; Wis. Department of Public
Instruction, Referendum Information, supra note 151.
155. Hoxby, supra note 5, at 1189.
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reform. Prior to the change in the state aid formula, the tax price faced6
by a school district depended on per-pupil equalized valuation.
However, for districts above the state average per-pupil property value,
state aid was reduced when a school district increased its own-source
spending effort, creating a disincentive effect. That is, the state aid
formula tended to discourage spending for these districts." 7 Ironically,
the wealthier districts that received no equalization aid experienced no
change in incentives.'58
Following the 1996-1997 reform, the tax price in a given school
district still depended on per-student property valuation, but the tax
prices, and thus incentives for own-source spending, changed
considerably. As outlined in greater detail below and as illustrated by
Andrew Reschovsky, in 2001-2002 the tax price faced by a few of the
wealthiest school districts (those with per student property values in
excess of $903,569) equaled one.'59 For school districts with per student
property valuations between $325,154 and $903,569 and per-pupil
spending greater than $6848, the tax price is greater than one.' 6° For
these school districts, an additional dollar of spending requires more
than a dollar of own-source funding because state aid declines as own
spending effort increases.'6' However, for school districts with per-pupil62
property valuation less than $325,154, the tax price is less than one.
For these school districts an increase in spending of one dollar requires
less than a dollar of own-source spending because school aid increases
with increases in own-spending effort. 163 The appendix provides
detailed information on how to calculate the tax price for each school
district in Wisconsin in the pre-reform (1994-1995) and post-reform
period.
While the tax price, in principle, is a fundamental factor that may
play a role in spending decisions, perhaps the imposition of revenue
caps is even more important in practice. This is so because what a
district is allowed to spend in future years is affected by the prior year's
spending decisions. Failure to increase own-source revenues to the
extent allowed under the revenue cap effectively limits spending in all
156. WIS. STAT. § 121.07(7)(a)-(b) (1994).
157. ROSSMILLER, supra note 39, at 3.
158. RESCHOVSKY, supra note 10, at 11.
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160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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subsequent years. The nature of the cap provided an incentive to
increase revenues, spending, or both by the fullest amount possible."6
In the next Part, we evaluate the degree to which changing state aid
formulas and revenue cap policies have altered spending in school
districts across the state.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

The estimation approach uses as the independent variable AS i where
AS, is defined as the real change in per pupil spending for school district i
over the 1995-2002 period:
AS i = AXiy +

i(l)

where AX represents a set of independent variables that are assumed to
determine changes in per pupil spending, , is a vector of coefficients, and P,
is the error term. We estimate the change in per-pupil spending as
opposed to the level of spending because we hope to identify whether or
not the policy changes that occurred in 1996-1997 had an impact on
spending patterns and the distribution of resources across the state.
Estimating this first-difference equation better isolates the effects of the
policy changes and may reduce concerns about endogeneity 65
Our primary focus is to estimate the impact of changes in the school
finance formula and the impacts of revenue caps on spending decisions
across the state. To that end, in this analysis, two primary independent
variables are per-pupil state equalization aid and the inverted tax price.
As described by Hoxby, school finance schemes have two effects: an
income effect and a price effect.'66 Changes in per-pupil state equalization
aid accounts for the changes in funding from the state, which may affect
school district overall spending levels. In addition, the inverted tax price
variable indicates how much an additional dollar of spending will cost the
164. Policymakers recognized this issue and over the term of the revenue caps have
prov.ded means for school districts to recover portions of potential revenues that had not
been realized in the prior year. See WIS. STAT. § i21.91(4)(dg) (2003-2004)
165. Econometric analysis can be hampered by simultaneity. For example, the level of
per-pupil spending depends in part on the state aid formula. But the state aid depends in part
on how much a school district decides to spend. This simultaneity can lead to biased
coefficient estimates. However, with the significant, arguably exogenous, change in the
school finance equalization formula, we can estimate the effect of the change in policy on the
change in spending. This approach allows us to isolate the effect of changing policy on
spending patterns.
166. Hoxby, supra note 5, at 1228.
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school district in own-source revenues. As previously described, for
poorer districts an additional dollar of spending will cost less than a dollar
of own-source revenues, and for a wealthier district an additional dollar of
spending will cost more than a dollar of own-source revenue. Thus, poorer
districts have an incentive to increase spending, and wealthier districts
have an incentive to reduce spending.
A secondary focus of this paper is the impact of school district
referenda activity on the extent to which school district expenditures and
tax rates are converging. One way that a school district may circumvent
attempts by the state to limit spending is via the referenda process. Earlier
work by Maher and Skidmore shows that following the state's assumption
of two-thirds of school costs and changes to the equalization aid formula,
poorer districts had better success in passing bonding referenda.167 The
question here is whether successful referenda passage, both for bonding
and exceeding the revenue cap, affected changes in school district
spending and tax rates. We therefore include as explanatory variables perpupil dollars of successful bonding referenda over the 1996-2001 period,
and the per-pupil amount of dollars approved by voters to exceed the
revenue cap.
We also hope to evaluate whether the disparity across districts in
spending was reduced by the changes in school finance policy. Thus, in
addition to estimating a regression using all school districts, we also
estimate two additional regressions: one for low per-pupil wealth districts
and one for high per-pupil wealth districts as defined in the initial period
of analysis. This approach allows us to examine whether spending in poor
districts is coming up or spending in wealthy districts is coming down as a
result of changes in the state aid formula.
To isolate the effects of changing policy, we also control for factors that
may affect changes in per-pupil spending levels. In our regression analysis
we include the following variables as controls: change in poverty rate,
change in per-pupil equalized valuation, and change in the proportion of
school-age children in the population. We expect that as the poverty rate
increases, per-pupil spending will fall, and as per-pupil property valuation
and the proportion of school-age children in the population increase, perpupil spending will also increase.
Given that the courts in Wisconsin have interpreted the uniformity
clause to mean that school districts ought to have roughly equivalent tax

167. Maher & Skidmore, supra note 147, at 17.
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effort, ' 68 one goal of the state has been to reduce the disparity across the
state in property tax rates. 169 We therefore also estimate a regression in
which the change in the mill rate is the dependent variable:

Ar, = AXiy

+

pi(2

)

where r is the school district mill rate and AX represents a series of
variables thought to determine changes in tax rates across school districts.
Again, our two primary variables of interest are per-pupil state aid
(income effect) and the inverted tax price (price effect). We include the
same series of variables above as controls, and we estimate three
regressions: a regression that uses data from all school districts; a
regression that uses data from just low-spending districts (bottom half of
all school districts); and a regression that uses data for high spending
districts (top half of all school districts), as defined in the initial period of
analysis.
Summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis are presented
in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 includes summary statistics for all districts, as
well as for high-spending (above average) and low-spending (below
average) districts. Table 6 provides summary statistics for high property
tax rate (above average) and low property tax rate (below average) school
districts. Note in Table 5 that per-pupil state equalization aid increased
$1545 overall with the largest increase (about a $500 differential) going to
the lower spending districts. Also, consistent with our earlier work, the
amounts of approved bonding referenda vary substantially between lowand high-spending districts ($6088 per pupil versus $3829 per pupil).
We now turn to a discussion of our estimation results in Table 7, which
are generated using ordinary least squares regression analysis. The
adjusted R2 indicates that 33% to 51% of the variation in changes in perpupil spending is explained in our regressions. Similarly, the property tax
rate regressions explain from 29% to 35% of the variation in property tax
rates. The overall performance of the regressions is reasonably strong for
a first-differenced cross-sectional analysis.
Consider the coefficient
estimates in the per-pupil spending equation on our two primary policy
vahriaes change in .tate nid and change in inverted tax price. According
to these estimates, on average an additional dollar of state equalization aid
increases spending by $0.33 on average. However, state aid appears to
168. See Vincent v. Voight, 2000 WI 93, l 3-4, 6, 236 Wis. 2d 588,
3-4, 6, 614
N.W.2d 388, IT 3-4, 6; Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 557, 247 N.W.2d 141, 155 (1976).

169. See Wis. STAT. § 121.01 (2003-2004).
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have increased spending in low-spending districts more so than highspending districts. The regressions show that in low-spending districts
every dollar of state aid increases spending by $0.68, but there is no effect
in the high-spending districts. Note, however, that increases in state aid do
not lead to dollar-for-dollar increases in spending, and in fact increases in
aid actually reduce tax rates, especially in low rate (high-spending)
districts.
Increases (or reductions) in the inverted tax price have led to increases
(or decreases) in spending. These estimates show that an increase
(decrease) in the inverted tax price of 0.1 increases (reduces) spending by
$31 per pupil. The tax rate regressions also show that increases
(reductions) in the inverted tax price served to decrease (increase) tax
rates, and this is particularly true for high tax rate districts. Thus, while the
net increase in state aid in low income districts has served to increase
overall spending at $0.68 per dollar and reduce property tax rates, the
effect is offset by reductions in the inverted tax prices resulting from the
changes in the state aid formula. On the other hand, changes in school
finance appear to have had a much smaller effect on spending in highspending and low rate districts. Taken together, net changes in funding
along with changes in the revenue limit appear to have served to reduce
spending disparities across school districts by bringing spending up in lowspending districts, but had little impact on spending in high-spending
districts. These results also suggest that altering the state aid formula in
such a way as to make the tax price more favorable might further reduce
disparities in spending across school districts.
Perhaps not surprisingly, school district referenda activity is
significantly related to both changes in spending and tax rates. For every
$1 change in successful bonding referenda activity, spending through debt
service increases by $0.03. Interestingly, the impacts of these referenda
appear to vary between low- and high-spending districts by over three and
a half cents per pupil. While this may not appear to be substantial,
remember that the average bonding referendum was over $5000 per pupil.
Looking at successful referenda to exceed revenue caps, the impact
appears to be significant for low-spending districts but insignificant for
high-spending districts. This result suggests that, at least with respect to
these types of referenda, successful passage has contributed to the
convergence of school district spending. An additional effect of the policy
allowing referenda to exceed revenue caps has been a reduction in the
growth of tax rates for high-tax rate districts more so than for districts with
lower tax rates.
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Before turning to our conclusions, we first provide a brief review of the
coefficient estimates on the control variables. Generally, the control
variables have the expected signs. Increases in tax rates and per-pupil
equalized valuation increase spending. Increases in poverty reduce perpupil spending, and increases in school age population increase per-pupil
spending. However, changes in percent rural do not significantly affect
per-pupil spending or tax rates. These estimates are generally consistent
with previous studies and thus provide some confidence that our primary
variables of interest (change per pupil, state aid, inverted tax price, and
referenda for bonding and exceeding revenue caps) generate reasonable
coefficient estimates.
V. CONCLUSIONS

The changes in Wisconsin's education finance system appear to have
reduced disparities in per-pupil spending, but perhaps surprisingly,
disparities in local tax effort (as measured by property tax rates) have
increased. Increased state aid has translated into increased spending in
lower spending districts and tax relief in higher spending and higher
wealth districts. The modest change in tax price appears to have
reduced spending and increased tax rates in lower spending districts, but
also to have had little impact on either spending or tax rates in highspending districts. Finally, both low- and high-spending districts have
increased spending and tax effort when they can successfully pass a
referenda measure.
The infusion of state aid, the manner in which those aids were
distributed to school districts, and revenue caps gave the state significant
control over school district fiscal policy. A key release valve afforded to
school districts by the state has been the referenda process. Within the
context of spending and tax effort, successful referenda have had mixed
results. Approved bonding referenda led to greater spending growth by
already high-spending districts when compared to low-spending districts.
On the other hand, passage of referenda to exceed revenue caps appears
to have increased spending in lower spending districts more so than
high-spending districts. This. of course, suggests that the referenda
process has, to some degree, allowed school districts io retain local
control.
The empirical analysis presented here indicates that Wisconsin's
most recent changes in education finance have not reduced disparities in
tax effort if one defines tax effort by property tax rates. Rather, tax rate
disparities have increased since reform. In short, property tax relief has

650
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been distributed primarily to the wealthy, not necessarily to those facing
the highest relative property tax burdens. On the other hand, disparities
in per-pupil spending appear to have been reduced as a result of the
policy changes. As policymakers once again consider the nature of
education finance in Wisconsin, they may find this analysis useful.
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170. RESCHOVSKY, supra note 10, at 11.
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TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF STATUTORY BASIS FOR STATE FACTORS IN
EQUALIZATION AID FORMULA
Aid
Year

State Aid Factor

Statutory Definition and Amount in Given
Year

19941995

Primary
Guaranteed Value
per Member
(PGVM)

Section 121.07(7)(a): "The 'primary guaranteed
valuation per member' is an amount, rounded to
the next lowest dollar, that, after subtraction of
payments under [various sections], fully
distributes the sum of the amount remaining
7 in
the appropriation under s. 20.255 (2)(ac)."' 1
[$357,837]

Primary Cost
Ceiling (PCC)

Section 121.07(6)(b) of the statutes was repealed
and recreated to read: "The 'primary ceiling cost
per member' shall be the amount determined by
multiplying the primary ceiling cost per member
in the previous school year by the rate certified
under s. 73.03 (46) [consumer price index] and
adding the result to the primary ceiling cost per
member in the previous school year."'" [$5617]

Secondary
Guaranteed Value
per
Member
(SGVM)

In 1994, section 121.07(7)(b) defined the SGVM
as equal to 106% of the statewide average
equalized property value per member rounded to
the next lowest dollar.' 73 [$216,457]

Primary
Guaranteed Value
per Member
(PGVM)

Section 121.07(7)(a): "The 'primary guaranteed
valuation per member' is $1,930,000"71 (changed
from $2,000,000).175 [$1,930,000]

Primary Cost

Section 121.07(6)(b): "The 'primary ceiling

Ceiling (PCC)

cost per member'

20012002

is

$1,000.,,176 [$1000]

Wis. STAT. § 121.07(7)(a) (1993-1994).
Act of Apr. 14, 1994, Act 310, 1993 Wis. Sess. Laws 315.
WIS. STAT. § 121.07(7)(b) (1993-1994).
WIS. STAT. § 121.07(7)(a) (2001-2002).
2001 Executive Budget Act, Act 16, 2001 Wis. Sess. Laws 1473.
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)
COMPARISON OF STATUTORY BASIS FOR STATE FACTORS IN
EQUALIZATION AID FORMULA

State Aid Factor

Aid
Year
20012002

176.
177.
178.
179.

Statutory Definition and Amount in Given
Year

Secondary
Guaranteed Value
per Member
(SGVM)

Section 121.07(7)(b): "The 'secondary
guaranteed valuation per member' is an
amount, rounded to the next lowest dollar,
that, after subtraction of payments under
ss... fully distributes an amount equal to
the amount remaining in the appropriation
under s. 20.255 (2)(ac).' 77 [$903,569]

Secondary Cost
Ceiling (SCC)

Section 121.07(6)(d) of the statutes was
repealed and recreated to read: "The
"secondary ceiling cost per member' in the
2001-02 school year and in each school year
thereafter is an amount determined by
dividing the.state total shared cost in the
previous school year by the state total
membership in the previous school year and
multiplying the result by 0.90.,,178 [$6848]

Tertiary
Guaranteed Value
per Member
(TGVM)

Section 121.07(7)(bm): "The 'tertiary
guaranteed valuation per member' is the
amount rounded to the next lower dollar
determined by dividing the equalized
valuation of the state by the state total
membership."'' 79 [$325,154]

WIS.
Id. §
Id. §
WIS.

STAT. § 121.07(6)(b) (2001-2002).
121.07(7)(b).
121.07(6)(d); 2001 Executive Budget Act, Act 16, 2001 Wis. Sess. Laws 549.
STAT. § 121.07(7)(bm) (2001-2002).
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TABLE 2
REVENUE CAP-ALLOWED INCREASES" s

Revenue Cap Year
1993-1994
1994-1995
1995-1996
1996-1997
1997-1998
1998-1999
1999-2000
2000-2001
2001-2002

Allowable Incremental Increase
$190 or CPI-u (3.2%) $190 $194.37 or CPI-u (2.3%) $194.37 $200
$206
$206
$208.88
$212.43
$220.29
$226.68

TABLE 3
REVENUE CAPS Low SPENDING THRESHOLDS 81

Revenue Cap Year
1993-1994
1994-1995
1995-1996
1996-1997
1997-1998
1998-1999
1999-2000
2000-2001
2001-2002

Low Spending Threshold

$5300
$5600
$5900
$6100
$6300
$6500
$6700

180. KAVA & OLIN, supra note 119, at 3; see WIS. STAT. § 121.91.
181. See generally WIS. STAT. § 121.91 (2003-2004); Wisconsin Department of Public
Instruction, supra note 116.
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TABLE 4
SCHOOL DISTRICTS ELIGIBLE FOR ANNUAL INCREASE 82
SCHOOL DISTRIcTs ELIGIBLE FOR ANNUAL
1995-1996 Eligible School
Districts

1995-1996
Increase

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

ALMOND-BANCROFT
AMERY
AUBURNDALE
BERLIN AREA
CADOTT COMMUNITY
CAMERON
CAMPBELLSPORT
DENMARK
ELROY-KENDALL-WILTON
FENNIMORE COMMUNITY
HAYWARD COMMUNITY
IOLA-SCANDINAVIA
LUXEMBURG-CASCO
MARINETFE
MARION
MEDFORD AREA
OCONTO
OOSTBURG
PITrSVILLE
RAYMOND #14
RICE LAKE AREA
STANLEY-BOYD AREA
TOMAH AREA
UNION GROVE J1
WASHINGTON-CALDWELL
WATERFORD J1 (V)
WAUTOMA AREA
WILD ROSE

200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200

29

WN1NECONNE COMTh

200

29

Aggregate
Average

!TY

$5,800

1995-1996 Low
Spending Adjust
61.63
37.38
148.23
229.41
202.63
61.01
567.79
179.23
378.63
68.13
118.64
15.58
244.31
129.58
29.63
175.17
138.63
0.64
188.17
294.37
61.63
237.01
312.58
148.61
265.73
694.4
153.62
10.63
13.59
$5,166.59
$178.16

182. Data files from Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction to the authors (Sept.
25, 2006) (on file with authors); Wis. Department of Public Instruction, School District
Revenue Limits, http://dpi.wi.gov/sfs/revlim.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
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TABLE 4 (CONTINUED)
SCHOOL DISTRICTS ELIGIBLE FOR ANNUAL INCREASE
INCREASE

2001-2002 Eligible School
Districts
1
2
3
4
4

CAMPBELLSPORT
OCONTO
UNION GROVE J1
WATERFORD J1 (V)
Aggregate
Average

2001-2002
Increase
226.68
226.68
226.68
226.68
$906.72

2001-2002 Low
Spending Adjust
136.76
242.38
10.57
91.38
$481.09
$120.27
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TABLE 5

SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR

Low AND HIGH SPENDING DISTRICrS' 8 3
High-spending
. Districts
Standard
Mean
Dv
Dev.

Low-spending
All School Districts
All___
School
_
DistriDistricts
Mean

Standard
De.
Dev.

Mean

Standard
Dc.
Dev.

2393.74

737.74

2501.44

577.94

2231.54

905.94

Change in Mill
Rate

0.0065

0.638

-0.0146

0.568

0.0417

0.7313

Changein
State Aid

1545.45

716.71

1734.74

561.99

1260.39

824.16

-0.0099

0.015

-0.0100

0.0125

-0.0098

0.0181

74.283

34.683

73.432

29.239

75.565

41.62

-0.0035

0.022

-0.0058

0.020

-0.0001

0.0235

-0.0929

0.2298

-0.1116

0.2045

-0.0648

0.2615

5186.88

5791.70

6088.58

5848.49

3828.96

5446.14

178.65

474.43

178.96

465.51

178.19

488.96

Dependent
Variables
Real Change
in Per Pupil
Spending
Independent
Variables

Change in Pct.
Of Children in
Poverty
Change in
Real per Pupil
Equalized
Valuation
Change in
School-Aged
Children
Change in
Inverted Tax
Price
Bonding
Referenda per
Member
(1996-2001)
Exceed
Revenue Cap
Referenda per

I

(1996-2001)
N

421

1253

168

183. Data files from Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction to the authors, supra
note 182; Wis. Department of Public Instruction, supra note 182.
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TABLE 6
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR HIGH AND Low TAX RATE DISTRICTS 1 84
Low-Tax
Rate
DirctDsrcs
Districts

All School Districts

High-Tax Rate
Districts

Mean

Standard
De.
Dev.

Mean

Standard
De.
Dev.

Mean

Standard
Dv
Dev.

0.0065

0.638

0.1346

0.605

-0.119

0.646

-0.0099

0.015

-0.0084

0.0156

-0.0113

0.0143

74.095

34.856

71.166

34.43

76.97

35.11

-0.0034

0.022

-0.0009

0.24

-0.0059

0.0195

-0.0914

0.232

-0.09

0.262

-0.0927

0.198

5174.59

5790.33

5671.50

5668.47

4687.01

5879.95

178.23

473.95

173.94

436.14

182.43

509.31

Dependent
Variables
Change in
School District
Tax Rate
Independent
Variables
Change in Pct.
of Children in
Poverty
Change in Real
per Pupil
Equalized
Valuation
Change in
School Aged
Children
Change in
Inverted Tax
Price
Bonding
Referenda per
Member (19962001)
Exceed
Revenue Cap
Referenda per
Member (19962001)
N

422

209

213

184. Data files from Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction to the authors, supra
note 182; Wis. Department of Public Instruction, supra note 182.
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TABLE 7
WISCONSIN SCHOOL SPENDING REGRESSION ESTIMATES: 1995 AND 2002""

OLS Regressionsa
Dep. Var.: Change in Per Pupil
Full Sample
Constant

Spending
Low
Spending
Districts

High
Spending
Districts

590.22 ***
331.844 **
(56.239)
0.337 ***
(0.059)
-5929.8 ***
(2152.51)
14.416 ***
(1.410)
2264.5
(1500.39)
-52.09

20.359 *
519.92 ***
(53.679)
0.680 ***
(0.076)
-4513.8
(2220.38)
16.413 ***
(1.571)
-4289.6 ***
(1400.497)
-28.16

Change in Inverted Tax Price

(42.404)
310.52*
13.52)
(138.52)

(30.39)
542.10"**
(1.1 )
(139.61)

756.525 ***
173.368 *
(98.09)
0.107
(0.098)
-7576.5 **
(3514.42)
14.211 ***
(2.362)
9352.9 ***
(2717.029)
-160.24
604
(173.357)
163.16
13.16
(230.068)

Bonding Referenda per Pupil
Exceed Revenue Cap Referenda
per Pupil
Adjusted R 2
N

0.031***
(0.006)
0.122*
(0.064)
0.330
421

0.011**
(0.005)
0.148 **
(0.057)
0.500
253

0.047 ***
(0.011)
-0.003
(0.119)
0.350
168

Change in State Aid
Change in Pct. Children in
Poverty
Change in per Pupil Property
Valuation
Change in School-Aged
Population
Change in Percent Rural-5.9281

Standard error in parentheses
Indicates 10% significance level for a two-tailed test.
** Indicates 5% significance level for a two-tailed test.
Indicates 1% significance level for a two-tailed test.
*

185. See generally Maher & Skidmore, supra note 147; Data files from Wisconsin
Department of Public Instruction to the authors, supra note 182; Wis. Department of Public
Instruction, supra note 182.
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TABLE 7 (CONTINUED)
WISCONSIN SCHOOL SPENDING REGRESSION ESTIMATES: 1995 AND 2002

OLS Regressions'
Dep. Var.: Change in District Mill Rate
Constant
Change in Tax Rate

Full Sample
0.953 ***

Low Tax
Rate Districts
1.135 ***

High Tax
Rate Districts
0.408

-0.00029 ***
(.000049)

-0.00034 ***
(.000053)

-0.000078
(0.0001)

4.426 **

0.342

9.116 ***

Poverty
Change in per Pupil

(1.873)
-0.0098 ***

(2.366)
-0.010 ***

(2.949)
-0.0079 ***

Property Valuation

(0.0011)

(0.0014)

(0.0019)

Change in School-Aged
Population

Change in Percent Rural

-0.457
(1.314)
-0.0054
0.0371
(0.0371)

0.3454
(1.573)
0.0095
0.035
(0.0351)

-3.134
(2.196)
-0.232
-0.232
(0.293)

Change in Inverted Tax

-0.299 **

-0.194

-0.687 ***

Price
Bonding Referenda per
Pupil

(0.120)

(0.1344)

(0.231)

.000041 ***

0.000037 ***

(0.0000045)

(0.000006)

(.0000065)

Exceed Revenue Cap
Referenda per Pupil

0.00016 ***
(.0000555)

0.00022 ***
(.0000797)

0.00013 *
(.000076)

0.313
421

0.351
209

0.285
212

Change in Pct. Children in

Adjusted R 2
N

Standard error in parentheses
Indicates 10% significance level for a two-tailed test.
** Indicates 5% significance level for a two-tailed test.
Indicates 1% significance level for a two-tailed test.
o

*

0.0000415
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APPENDIX
Calculationof Tax Prices
Below we describe in detail how we calculate the tax prices for each
school district in Wisconsin in the pre-reform and the post-reform
periods. 6 A school district's tax price is defined as the amount of
revenue a district has to raise in order to spend an extra dollar. To
generate the tax price for each school district in pre- and post-reform,
consider the following definitions:
"
"
*
"
*
*
"

EQV = per pupil equalized value of property in the
school district
r = property tax rate for the school district
G = per pupil general state aid to a school district
SC = shared cost, or per pupil spending from school
district own sources (r*EQV)
A - state equalization aid per pupil to the school district
S = total spending per pupil for the school district
Tax Price = EQV/( a S/ t r)
Pre-1996 Formula

Prior to the 1996-1997 change in education finance, state
equalization aid depended on a two-tier formula. To illustrate, in 19941995 if shared costs were less than or equal to $5617, the district
received primary aid according to the following formula:
A = [1 - (EQV/357,837)]*SC
However, if districts spent more than $5617, they received both primary
and secondary aid:
[1 - I~r_,..

Vl33I,03I)] "dOII

secondary = [1 - (EQV/216,457)]*[SC - 5617]
Because SC = r*EQV, we replace SC with r*EQV in the equations:
186. The tax price calculations are taken from Maher & Skidmore, supra note 147.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[90:621

secondary = [1 - (EQV/216,457)]*[ r*EQV - 5617]
We now write the total school district per pupil budget constraint as:

S

=

r*EQV+ G+ A

For school districts spending less than $5617:
(a) S = r*EQV + G + [1 - (EQV/$357,837)]* r*EQV
For school districts spending more than $5617:
(b)

S = r*EQV+G+[1 - (EQV/$357,837)]*[$5617]+[1-(EQV/$216,457)]*[r*EQV-$5617]

To generate the tax price under the old school finance formula, we must
take the partial derivative of S with respect to r. For scenario (a) the
partial derivative is:

a S/a r = EQV + [EQV - (EQV2 /$357,837)]
= 2EQV - (EQV2/$357,837)
The tax price is therefore: EQV/( a S/ a r) or EQV/[2EQV - (EQV2 /$357,837)].

Under scenario (b), the partial derivative of S with respect to r is:

a S/

r = EQV + [EQV - (EQV 2/$216,457)]
= 2EQV - (EQV/$216,457)

Here, the tax price is EQV/[2EQV - (EQV 2/$216,457)]
The value of the tax price depends on per-pupil equalized valuation
(EQV). Roughly, for the lower half of the school districts in terms of
per-pupil wealth, the tax price <1 but for the upper half of the districts
the tax price >1. It is important to note that for districts that have an
EQV that leads to zero state equalization aid (the wealthier districts), an
additional dollar of property tax revenue will generate an additional
dollar of spending, so that tax price = 1. Under this old regime, except
for the lowest wealth districts and the very wealthiest districts that
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receive no equalization aid, the state equalization
discourages spending.

aid formula

Post-1996 Formula
Following reform, Wisconsin's school finance formula changed
substantially. There are now four categories of school districts based on
EQV and SC. '
To illustrate, in 2001-2002 these categories were
defined as:
1.
2.
3.
4.

EQV > $903,569
$325,154 < EQV < $903,569 and per pupil spending > $6848
EQV < $325,154 and per pupil spending > $6848
Per-pupil spending < $6848

However, state equalization aid (A) depends on which of the above
categories the school districts falls:
(a) For (1), A = $1000 - 0.5 mills*EQV, if EQV < $2 million, and A
= 0 if EQV > $2 million
(b) For (2) and (3), A = ($6848 - 9.972mills*EQV) + [{1 (EQV/$325,154)*SC - $6848)]
(c) For (4),
A = ($1000 - 0.5mills*EQV)
+ [11
(EQV/$903,569)1*(SC - $1000)]
Because SC = r*EQV + G, we replace SC with r*EQV + G in equations
(2) and (3):
(a) A = $1000 - 0.5 mills*EQV, if EQV < $2 million, and A = 0 if
EQV > $2 million
(b) A = ($6848 - 9.972mills*EQV) + [11 - (EQV/$325,154)}*(r*EQV
+ G - $6848)
(c) A = ($1000 - 0.5mills*EQV) + [{1 - (EQV/$903,569)}*(r*EQV
"G-

10

The tax price equations can now be derived from the per pupil
budget constraint. First, if A is determined by equation (1), tax price =
EQV/(a S/a r) = 1. That is, every dollar of additional spending requires

187. RESCHOVSKY, supra note 10, at 10.
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a dollar of own source property tax revenues.
If A is determined by equations (2) and (3):
Z S/a r = EQV + 11 - (EQV/$325,154))*(EQV)
= 2*EQV - (EQV2/$325,154)
The tax price equation is then EQV/[2*EQV - (EQV2/$325,154)]
As long as EQV < $325,154 (category (3) school districts), the tax
price is <1. For these districts, an additional dollar of spending requires
less than a dollar of own-source property tax revenues because of the
inflow of additional state equalization aid. However, if EQV > $325,154
(category (2) school districts), the tax price >1. For these districts, an
additional dollar of spending requires more than a dollar of own-source
property tax revenues because state aid is reduced as own spending
increases.
If A is determined by equation (4):
a S/a r = EQV + 11 - (EQV/$903,569)}*(EQV)
= 2*EQV - (EQV 2/$903,569)1
Here the tax price is EQV/[2*EQV - (EQV 2/$903,569)]
For school districts falling into this category (which is only a few), the
tax price can be quite low. An additional dollar of spending requires
much less than a dollar of own-source property tax revenue.
Comparisonof Pre- and Post-reform Incentives
From the formulae, it is difficult to identify the pattern of changes in
tax price across school districts from pre- to post-reform. A particular
school district's tax price depends on per pupil spending from own
sources and tax base. An evaluation of the data shows that nearly all
school districts experienced changes in tax price, but increases
(decreases) do not appear to depend systematically on per pupil
equalized value.
Following Hoxby and others, in the empirical analysis we use the
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inverted tax price so that we expect a positive coefficient. 88 That is, a
higher inverted tax price (or lower tax price) as it is for the poorer
districts, the greater is the probability of higher proportional spending
growth/lower tax rate growth. Conversely, the lower the inverted tax
price (or higher tax price) as it is for wealthy districts, the lower is the
probability of higher proportional spending growth/lower tax rate
growth.

188. See Hoxby, supra note 5, at 1205.

*

*

*

